We introduce a notion of strategically selective coideal, and show that tall strategically selective coideals do not exist under AD R , generalizing a classical theorem of Mathias. We discuss some issues involved in generalizing this result to semiselective coideals.
The axiom AD R asserts the determinacy of all games of length ω where the players play subsets of ω. Woodin has shown the consistency of AD R relative to large cardinals (see Theorem 9.3 of [10] , for instance). The axiom DC is a weak form of the Axiom of Choice, asserting that each tree of height ω without terminal nodes has an infinite branch. The axiom DC R is the restriction of of DC to trees on R; DC R is easily seen to be a consequence of AD R . Mathias [8] showed that AD R implies that there are no tall selective coideals on ω. In this note we give a generalization of this fact. Our proof consists of combining Mathias's proof with results of Solovay and Woodin.
Given a coideal C, we let G C be the game of length ω in which players I and II choose the members of a ⊆-decreasing sequence of elements of C, with II winning if the sequence constructed has a fast diagonalization in C.
Definition.
A coideal C is strategically selective if player I does not have a winning strategy in G C .
It follows almost immediately from the definitions that a selective coideal is strategically selective, as in this case all runs of the game G C are won by II. As defined by Farah [3] , a coideal C is semiselective if whenever A ∈ C and D i (i ∈ ω) are dense open subsets of the partial order (C, ⊆) below A, there exist sets A i ∈ D i (i ∈ ω) and a fast diagonalization of A i : i ∈ ω in C. As we shall see, the Axiom of Choice implies that the notions of strategically selective and semiselective are equivalent.
Assuming AD R , strategically selective coideals are easily seen to be semiselective; we don't know if the reverse implication holds. Uniformization is the statement that for each U ⊆ R × R, there is a partial function f : R → R with the property that for each x ∈ R, if there is a y such that (x, y) is in U , then x is in the domain of f and (x, f (x)) is in U . Uniformization an easy consequence of AD R , via a game in which each player plays once.
Theorem 0.2. If Uniformization holds, then every strategically selective codideal is semiselective.
Proof. Suppose that C is a coideal which is not semiselective, and let D i (i ∈ ω) and A ∈ C witness this. Fix a strategy Σ in G C for player I where I plays a subset of A in D 0 as his first move, and, for any i > 0, I plays in response to any sequence of length 2i an element of D i contained in the last move made by player II. Uniformization implies that there exists such a strategy. Now suppose that A = A i : i < ω is a run of G C where I has played according to Σ, and suppose toward a contradiction that {e i : i ∈ ω} is a fast diagonalization ofĀ in C. Then {e 2i+1 : i ∈ ω} and {e 2i : i ∈ ω} are each fast diagonalizations of A 2i : i ∈ ω , and at least one of these two sets is in C, giving a contradiction.
Given a coideal C, we let P C denote the partial order of mod-I containment on C, where I = P(ω) \ C. Farah [3] has shown that when C is semiselective, forcing with P C adds a selective ultrafilter (see Theorem 1.1 below).
The following is our main theorem. We begin with Solovay's result on the existence of a normal fine measure on P ℵ1 (R) under AD R . Here normality of a measure µ on P ℵ1 (R) means that if A ∈ µ and f is a function on A such that f (σ) is a nonempty subset of σ for each σ ∈ A, then there is a real x which is in f (σ) for µ-many σ.
Lemma 0.5 (Solovay [9] ). If AD R holds, then there is normal fine measure on P ℵ1 (R).
Proof. Given A ⊆ P ℵ1 (R), consider the game G m (A) where players I and II pick alternately pick finite sets of reals s i (i ∈ ω) and I wins if {s i : i ∈ ω} ∈ A. Let µ be the set of A for which I has a winning strategy in G m (A). That µ is fine (i.e., contains the set of supersets of each countable set of reals) is immediate. That it is an ultrafilter follows from running two strategies against one another. Normality follows the fact that given a family of games G x indexed by reals for which II has a winning strategy, there is a function picking such a strategy for each game, induced by the game where I first picks x and then I and II play G x . Fixing f as in the statement of normality and supposing that player II has a winning strategy for each payoff set of the form F x = {σ | x ∈ f (σ)}, we can build a countable set of reals σ ∈ dom(f ) which results from a run of G m (F x ) according to a winning strategy for player II, for each x ∈ σ, giving a contradiction.
Given a set of ordinals S and a formula φ, let us write A S,φ for the set
Formally extending a definition due to Woodin, we say that the pair (S, φ) is an ∞-Borel code for the set A S,φ , and we say that a set B ⊆ (ω ω ) <ω is ∞-Borel if there exists such a pair (S, φ) with A S,φ = B (i.e., if B has an ∞-Borel code). A tree on the ordinals projecting to a subset of ω ω is an example of an ∞-Borel code, but the assumption that every set of reals is ∞-Borel is weaker than the assumption that every set of reals is the projection of a tree on the ordinals. The statement that every subset of (ω ω ) <ω is ∞-Borel is easily seen to be equivalent to the assertion that every subset of ω ω is ∞-Borel, which in turn is part of Woodin's axiom AD + (see [4] ). The following theorem is unpublished.
Theorem 0.6 (Woodin). If AD R holds, then every set of reals is ∞-Borel.
Recall that Mathias forcing Q U relative to an ultrafilter U consists of pairs (s, A), where s is finite subset of ω and A ∈ U , with the order (s, A) ≥ (t, B) if s ⊆ t, B ⊆ A and t \ s ⊆ A. The following is due to Mathias ([8] , Theorem 2.0).
Theorem 0.7 (Mathias) . Suppose that M is a model of ZF + DC R and that U is a selective ultrafilter in M . Then a set x ⊆ ω is M -generic for Q U if and only if x \ y ∈ Fin for all y ∈ U .
The following proof puts together the facts listed above. The ultraproduct construction in the proof is taken from the proof of Theorem 9.39 from [11] , except that we use ∞-Borel codes instead of trees on the ordinals.
Proof of Theorem 0.3. Suppose that AD R holds, and that C is a tall strategically selective coideal. Fix a winning strategy Σ for player II in G C . By Theorem 0.6, there are formulas φ and ψ, and sets of ordinals S and T such that
Let µ be a normal fine measure on P ℵ1 (R). Let (M, E) be the ultraproduct
, for each σ ∈ P ℵ1 (R) (let F be the class of such functions),
• the members of M are the equivalence classes of functions in F, under the relation of mod-µ equivalence, and
For each set x ∈ L(R)[S, T, µ], let c x be the constant function from P ℵ1 (R) to {x}. Since µ normal (and thus countably complete), and L(R)[S, T, µ] satisfies DC (as AD R implies DC R ), (M, E) is wellfounded. A standard argument by induction on subformulas, using the normality of µ for the step corresponding to existential quantifiers, shows that for any finite set of functions f 1 , . . . , f n from F, and any n-ary formula φ,
for µ-many σ. Let us call this fact the elementarity of the ultraproduct. One consequence of this fact (and the wellfoundedness of (M, E)) is that there is an isomorphism π from (M, E) to an inner model of the form L(R, S * , T * ), where
. Then S * and T * are sets of ordinals. By the elementarity of the ultraproduct, A S,φ ⊆ A S * ,φ and A T,ψ ⊆ A T * ,ψ . Since
it follows again by elementarity that A S,φ = A S * ,φ and A T,ψ = A T * ,ψ . By the normality of µ (and elementarity once again), it follows that for µ-many σ, σ = R∩L(σ, S, T ) and A
(which is (C ×Σ)∩L(σ, S, T )) is the product of a tall strategically selective coideal and a strategy witnessing that it is strategically selective, in L(σ, S, T ). Fixing one such σ, there is an L(σ, S, T )-generic filter H for P L(σ,S,T ) C which is generated by a run of G C according to Σ. One can build such a run of G C by letting II play according to Σ and having I play to meet each dense set in L(σ, S, T ) from P L(σ,S,T ) C . Note that L(σ, S, T ) is closed under Σ. Furthermore, since σ is a countable, L(σ, S, T ) is contained in a model of Choice, which implies that P(P(R)) ∩ L(σ, S, T ) is countable, so there exists (in V ) an enumeration of the dense subsets of P
Let U be the selective ultrafilter in L(σ, S, T )[H] given by H. By Theorem 0.7, since Σ is a winning strategy for player II, there is an x ∈ C which is L(σ, S, T )[H]-generic for the Mathias forcing Q U . Some condition (s, B) in the corresponding generic filter then forces that the generic real will be the left coordinate of a pair in A S,φ . However, this is a contradiction, as some infinite subset of x containing s is not in C, and any such set is still generic below (s, B) , by Theorem 0.7.
Remark.
A one-point diagonalization of a sequence A i : i < ω ∈ P(ω) ω is a set E = {e i : i ∈ ω} (listed in increasing order) such that e i ∈ A i for all i ∈ ω. In an earlier version of this paper we used one-point diagonalizations instead of fast diagonalizations in the definitions of selective, semiselective and strategically selective. Example 0.9 below shows that these definitions are not equivalent. We note that [1] uses one-point diagonalizations in the definition of Ramsey (i.e., selective) ultrafilters; Example 0.9 shows that there is a gap in the proof of Theorem 4.5.2 there claiming to show that this definition is equivalent to the standard one. Similarly, Example 0.9 shows that the corresponding version of Theorem 0.3 using one-point diagonalizations in place of fast diagonalizations is false. The paper [7] cites (the earlier vesion of) this paper for proving this false version of Theorem 0.3. Modifying that paper to use the correct definitions requires making minor changes. 0.9 Example. LetF = {F n : n ∈ ω} be a partition of ω into finite sets, such that {|F n | : n ∈ ω} is infinite and F n ∩n = ∅ for all n ∈ ω. Let IF be the ideal of sets x ⊆ ω for which there exists an m ∈ ω such that |x ∩ F n | < m for all n ∈ ω. Then IF is F σ , so Borel. Let CF be the corresponding coideal. If, for each n ∈ ω, A n = ω \ m<n F m , then each A n is in CF and each fast diagonalization of the sequence A n : n ∈ ω intersects each F n at most 2 points, so is not in CF . On the other hand, ifB = B n : n ∈ ω is any ⊆-decreasing sequence of members of CF ,B has a one-point diagonalization in CF . This shows that changing "fast" to "one-point" in the definition of selective coideal gives a weaker notion (and similarly for semiselective and strategically selective). Assuming that the Continuum Hypothesis holds, one can easily construct an ultrafilter contained in CF with the property that each ⊆-descending ω-sequence from U has a one-point diagonalization in U .
Semiselective coideals
In this section we discuss some issues related to the question of whether AD R implies the nonexistence of tall semiselective coideals. First we note two alternate characterizations of semiselectivity shown by Farah in [3] . Theorem 1.1 can be proved in ZF. Theorem 1.1 (Farah [3] ). The following statements are equivalent, for a coideal C on ω.
2. The generic filter added by forcing with P C is a selective ultrafilter.
3. Forcing with P C does not add reals, and whenever {E} ∪ {B i : i ∈ ω} ⊆ C and for all i ∈ ω, E \ B i ∈ C, there exists an E ⊆ E in C such that for each i ∈ ω, E \ (i + 1) ⊆ B i .
Given any partial order P , let G ds (P ) be the game where players I and II alternately choose the members of a descending sequence of conditions in P , with I winning if the sequence does not have a lower bound in P . For any coideal C, a winning strategy for I in G ds (P C ) is a winning strategy for I in G C . By the second part of statement (3) of Theorem 1.1, if C is semiselective, then a winning strategy for II in G ds (P C ) is a winning strategy for II in G C . Theorem 0.3 shows that, assuming AD R , player I has a winning strategy in G C for each tall coideal C on ω. It follows that if C is a tall semiselective coideal on ω, and AD R holds, then I has a winning strategy in G ds (P C ). The first part of the following proposition then shows that forcing with P C must make DC R fail.
Proposition 1.2 (ZF).
Suppose that C is a coideal on ω such that forcing with P C does not add subsets of ω.
1. If I has a winning strategy in G ds (P C ), then DC R fails after forcing with with P C .
2. If II has a winning strategy in G ds (P C ), and DC R holds, then it holds after forcing with P C .
Proof. For the first part of the proposition, let τ be a winning strategy for I in G ds (P C ), and let G ⊆ C be generic for P C . In V [G], consider the set of finite sequences from G of odd length which are partial plays of G ds (P C ) according to τ . Every such sequence is extended by a longer one, but no infinite play of G ds (P C ) according to τ can be forced by any condition in P C to be a subset of the generic filter. For the second part, fix A ∈ C, a winning strategy τ for II in G ds (P C ) and a P C -name σ for a set of finite sequences of reals with the property that every sequence in the set is extended by another sequence in the set. Consider the set of finite sequences
for which A 0 ⊆ A, A 0 , . . . , A 2n+1 is a partial play of G ds (P C ) according to τ , and each A 2i forces that x 0 , x 2 , . . . , x 2i is a member of the realization of σ. Then DC R , plus the fact that τ is a winning strategy for II, gives a condition below A forcing some infinite sequence to be a path through the realization of σ.
A positive answer to any part of the following question would show that no tall semiselective coideals exist, assuming AD R .
1.3 Question. Suppose that AD R holds, and let C be a coideal on ω. Must P C preserve DC R ? What if C is tall, or if P C is assumed not to add subsets of ω, or to be semiselective, or tall and semiselective? Proposition 1.4 shows that if C is a semiselective coideal, and there exist suitable choice functions, then C is strategically selective (from which it follows that under AC the two notions are equivalent). Given a function a as in the statement of Proposition 1.4, the existence of a function b follows from Uniformization.
Proposition 1.4 (ZF)
. Let C be a coideal, and let Σ be a winning strategy for I in G C . Let S be the set of finite partial runs τ in G C according to Σ for which it is II's turn to move. Suppose that there exist functions a on S and b on S × C such that
• for each τ ∈ S, a(τ ) is a maximal antichain in (C, ⊆) below the last member of τ , contained in the set of members of C which are responses by Σ to a move for II following τ ;
• for each τ ∈ S and B ∈ a(τ ), b(τ, B) is an element of C such that τ b(τ, B), B is a partial run of G C according to Σ.
Then C is not semiselective.
Proof. Let A 0 be the first move made by Σ. Let H be a generic filter for P C , with A 0 ∈ H. In V [H], consider the collection T consisting of those sequences of the form B 0 , . . . , B 2n contained in H, where for each even i < 2n, B i+2 is in a( B 0 , . . . , B i ) and B i+1 = b( B 0 , . . . , B i , B i+2 ). By genericity, each sequence in T has an extension in T . Since each a(τ ) (τ ∈ S) is an antichain, the members of T extend one another, and there exists a unique sequenceB = B i : i < ω whose finite initial segments are all in T . Suppose now toward a contradiction that C is semiselective. Then forcing with P C doesn't add reals, soB is in V . Since Σ is a winning strategy for I in G C ,B does not have a fast diagonalization in C. By part (3) of Theorem 1.1, then,B does not have a lower bound in C, so no element of C could force all of the elements ofB to be in H, giving a contradiction. Proposition 1.4 gives the following.
Theorem 1.5 (ZF).
If there exists a wellordering of R, and M is a model of ZF + AD R containing R, then there is no tall coideal in M which is semiselective in V .
Finally, we note that the following theorem of Todorcevic (a version of which appears in [3] ; the form given here is proved in [5] ) allows one to argue from the point of view of a model of the Axiom of Choice that certain inner models do not contain tall coideals which are semiselective in V . In the presence of suitably large cardinals (for instance, a measurable cardinal above infinitely many Woodin cardinals), typical inner models of determinacy (such as L(R)) have the property that all of their sets of reals are at least c-universally Baire in V (see, for instance, Theorems 3.3.9 and 3.3.13 of [6] ). Theorem 1.6 (Todorcevic). If U is a selective ultrafilter and I is a tall ideal on ω containing Fin which is c-universally Baire, then U ∩ I = ∅. Corollary 1.7. If C is a tall coideal in an inner model M containing the reals, and every set of reals in M is c-universally Baire, then C is not semiselective in V Proof. If C were semiselective in V , then forcing with P C would produce a selective ultrafilter disjoint from P(ω) \ C.
As with Theorem 1.5, the corollary to Todorcevic's result leaves open the possibility that there is a tall coideal which is semiselective in the model in question, but no longer semiselective in any outer model of Choice.
